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This paper develops a model of college admissions that emphasizes their role as a human
capital evaluation method. Given multiple dimensions of human capital, di⁄erent pattens of
human capital evaluation and develpment emerge as equilibria. These equilibria with a varying
emphasis on di⁄erent aspects of human capital can match an observed di⁄erence in college
admission patterns between East Asian countries and the U.S. The model has a macroeconomic
implication about the relationship between measured human capital and economic performances.
We demonstrate the support for this implication through cross-country regressions.
1 Introduction
University admissions provide an important evaluation method of human capital. College wage
premium exists,1 and part of it can be explained by a signalling theory - individuals with more de-
veloped human capital are more likely to attend higher education, or a higher education institution
will admit only those individuals.2 University admissions can also work as a major guideline for
individuals concerning what kind of human capital they should equip themselves with in order to
be productive in a society. This paper introduces a model of university admissions that emphasizes
their role as a human capital evaluation method. Though college admissions have been a subject of
research from various perspectives,3 this paper, to our knowledge, is the ￿rst theoretical attempt to
1For example, the hourly wages of college graduates are about 60% higher than those of high school graduates
with 1 to 3 years of experience in 1990s of the U.S. (Fang 2006)
2The screening by higher education institutions, in an extreme case, is so perfect that the income prospect of
individuals is not dependent on the speci￿c institution they attended if admission results to various institutions are
similar (Dale and Krueger 2002).
3It has been a subject of a matching problem since Gale and Sharpley (1962). Speci￿c aspects of college admissions
such as an a¢ rmative action (Bowen and Bok 1998 among others) or an early admission (Avery et.al 2003 and Lee
2009) have also been hotly debated.
1Table 1: Admissions Standards of Korean Universities
Components of Admissions Evaluation
KSAT High School Record Essay Test
Curricular Extracurricular
SNU Preliminary (200% of class) 100
Final 20 40 10 30
Korea Univ. Priority (70% of Class) 100
General (30% of Class) 50 45 5
emphasize this role.4 By modeling an interaction of universities￿admissions standards and students￿
decisions of human capital investment, we show that di⁄erent evaluation and development patterns
of human capital emerge as equilibria. Such di⁄erent patterns can match empirical patterns we
observe between East Asian countries and the U.S. Moreover, these patterns have a macroeconomic
implication about the relationship between measured human capital and economic performances.
Using a cross-country data set, we estimate this relationship and ￿nd a reasonable support for the
empirical relevance of the model.
The empirical pattern we want to highlight is a stark di⁄erence in observed university admis-
sions standards between East Asian countries and the U.S. While academic institutions in East
Asia predominantly use academic measures when admitting students, those in the U.S. use other
measures such as leadership and community involvement in addition to academic measures. Table
1 shows the regular admissions standards of Seoul National University (SNU) and Korea Univer-
sity.5 The important components are KSAT (Korean SAT), which is a nation-wide exam, and an
essay test. These components are all academic. SNU places 30% weights in essay writing tests
in the second round of selection, which measure mostly an academic ability. The only possible
non-academic component is extra-curricular activities in high school records, which is given 5 to
10% weights.6
Institutions in the U.S. rarely announce their admissions standards publicly. According to guides
in web sites of Harvard and Yale University, however, non-academic qualities such as leadership,
community involvement, curiosity, etc. are important in addition to academic accomplishments.
4Impacts of university admissions on high school education is well recognized by its practioners. See Atkinson
(2001).
5They do not apply to the school of education and the school of arts, where an interview or a portfolio of the art
works can play a role.
6Even this component can be mostly academic, since award winning records in various academic competitions such
as math olympiad count highly in this component. Recently, employing ￿nancial incentives, the Korean government
tries to encourage universities to introduce new admissions practices that are based on the evaluation of admission
o¢ cers. In early admissions, we may have seemingly quite di⁄erent admissions standards. But it is still controversial
whether the new practice really changes how universities admit students.
2Figure 1: Admissions Rates according to Ratings; US Instituion [Source: Avery et.al (2001)]
Figure 1, which is a direct quote from Avery et.al (2001), shows the admission rates of one institution
according to the ratings of admission o¢ cers. This institution has a personal rating as well as an
academic rating, and the admission rates vary according to the pair of these ratings. It is evident
that the personal rating also a⁄ects the admissions rates.
These clear di⁄erences in human capital evaluation lead to di⁄erent patterns of human capital
development in both societies. If we compare time use of high school students, East Asian students
spend most of their time on academic activities, while U.S. students divide their time between
academic activities and non-academic activities such as sports. While Japanese high school students
spend 60.4 hours per week on school work, U.S. students spend 30.0 hours on it. Instead U.S.
students spend more time in ￿ playing games and sports￿(7.0 hours per week) than Japanese students
(0.7 hours per week).7 Comparison results are similar between the U.S. and Korea. U.S. students
spend 6.3 hours on educational activities on an average weekday, while Korean students spend 10.7
hours on them. Again U.S. students spend more time on socializing and sports (4.6 hours) than
Korean students (2.0 hours).8
All these di⁄erences of human capital evaluation and development, however, cannot be wholly
7This comparison is based on years 1981-82 for U.S. and 1986 for Japan (Juster and Sta⁄ord 1991).
8Such ￿ndings are from American Time Use Survey (http://www.bls.gov/tus/charts/students.htm) and Korean
Time Use Survey (http://kosis.kr).
3ascribed to discrepancies in desirable characters of human capital. Non-academic factors also seem
to be very important in East Asian societies. According to a survey on employers in Korea,9 impor-
tant evaluation components in a job interview include non-academic factors such as responsibility
(19.7%), a capability to cooperate (13.4%), and communication skills (12.7%) as well as academic
factors - job related knowledge (20.8%). Many earnings regressions show that academic factors (or
cognitive abilities) are very important in the U.S. As economic environment is globalized, however,
we expect the contribution of human capital to the economy would become similar especially among
relatively advanced economies.
This paper o⁄ers an explanation about persistent di⁄erences in human capital development
patterns between countries. We develop a model with multiple dimensions of human capital where
a university tries to recognize and admit the most productive students and students develop human
capital to be successful in university admissions. Kinds of human capital to be analyzed are cognitive
skills usually meaning academic achievement and non-cognitive skills such as leadership and social
skills.
A coordination problem arises, since a certain type of human capital, to be utilized, should be
both developed and then recognized as productive. Students would have an incentive to develop
more a type of human capital that is more likely to be recognized. Universities would have an
incentive to more correctly recognize a type of human capital if there are more students equipped
with it. Therefore, we can have multiple coordinations: one involves low investment and less
recognition while the other involves high investment and more recognition. Moreover, since students
have limited time to invest in human capital, there will be a trade-o⁄ between the two dimensions
(cognitive and non-cognitive) of human capital. If students invest more in one aspect of human
capital, they have to reduce their investment in the other aspect.
With the coordination problem and trade-o⁄ combined, there can be multiple equilibria with
di⁄erent emphases on each type of human capital. If a university recognizes cognitive skills more,
students will invest more in cognitive skills and have to reduce their time on non-cognitive skills.
This will in turn induce the university to recognize less of non-cognitive skills and more of cognitive
skills. If universities recognize non-cognitive skills more, the same logic will lead to an enhancement
of non-cognitive skills. Especially, we can have coexisting equilibria with a complete emphasis on
cognitive skills alone and with a similar emphasis on both skills.
Multiple aspects of human capital we assume in the model are recently getting growing attention
in economic analysis. Traditionally, human capital has been equated with cognitive skills measured
by IQ or other test scores in economic analysis. This is because the measures of cognitive skills
are more readily available than those of non-cognitive skills, not because it is the only important
aspect of human capital (Carneiro and Heckman 2003). There have been new empirical analyses
9A news release by the Korea Employers Federation, 2006.
4which also consider e⁄ects of non-cognitive skills on labor market and schooling outcomes (Borghans
et.al 2008, Cunha and Heckman 2008, Heckman et.al 2006 among others). These studies generally
con￿rm non-negligible e⁄ects of non-cognitive skills. Non-academic measures used in the admission
process of U.S. institutions such as leadership quality, community involvement, or personal ratings
seem to accommodate the importance of non-cognitive skills.
It is also believed that non-cognitive skills can be obtained as a by-product of participation
in social activities such as sports, drama club, student government, and so on (Postlewaite and
Silverman 2005). The wage premium generated by participating in sports activities may be due to
the development of non-cognitive skills (Stevenson 2010). Time used in these activities, therefore,
can be thought of as an investment in non-cognitive skills.
Taking multiple dimensions of human capital into account, multiple equilibria of our model
can match with the empirical patterns described above. In East Asian countries, we see more
investment on cognitive skills (more time spent on academic activities) and more recognition of
them in university admissions. On the contrary, in the U.S., we have relatively more investment in
non-cognitive skills (more time spent on sports and socialization) and more recognition of them in
university admissions.
Our results also shed light on an international comparison of test scores and its implications.
High scores in international tests are usually interpreted as a better educational quality and are
reported to be related with better economic performances (Jamison et.al 2006 and Hanushek and
Woessmann 2008 among others). These test scores are, however, measures of cognitive skills only,
and measures of non-cognitive skills should be accounted for to correctly evaluate the relationship.10
Moreover, due to the aforementioned trade-o⁄ between two skills, the presence of an omitted
variable may systematically bias an estimate of the impact of cognitive skills on economic outcomes.
We suggest that the time use pattern of test takers can be used to alleviate such an omitted variable
problem.
In the ￿nal part of the paper, we implement an empirical exercise following the above idea. Our
empirical analysis reasonably supports the implications of the model. The time share invested in
non-cognitive skills is positively related to economic performances and adding the time use variable
tends to increase the e⁄ect of test scores on economic outcomes as predicted.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 brie￿ y discusses the related literature. Then we
introduce the model in Section 2 and analyze it in Section 3. Section 4 contains a brief discussion
on model settings. Section 5 discusses and tests empirical implications of the model. Then the
conclusion follows.
10Even though this is recognized in Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), non-availiability of the measures of non-
cognitive skills seems to let them go on with the analysis.
51.1 Related Literature
Multiple aspects of human capital is recently gaining more attention in economics (Carneiro and
Heckman 2003, Heckman et.al 2006, Cunha and Heckman 2007 and 2008, Borghans et.al 2008
among others). Studies empirically show a positive return of non-cognitive skills. This paper,
to our knowledge, is the ￿rst theoretical undertaking that deals with di⁄erent patterns of human
capital evaluation with multiple dimensions of human capital.
This paper is directly related to Lee (2007) in that di⁄erences in studying time of high school
students between the U.S. and East Asian countries are explicitly analyzed. Lee indicated that
U.S. students study more in college than in high school while the opposite is true for East Asian
students, explaining that signalling of students￿abilities happens in high school for East Asian
countries while it occurs in college in the U.S. Our study explains discrepancies of universities￿
admissions standards which were not addressed in Lee.
Though the purposes of modelling and speci￿c settings are very di⁄erent, the idea behind the
modeling framework of this paper is very similar to that of Mailath et al. (2000). Both Mailath et.al
and this paper put together two coordination failure models whose idea is quite common (Diamond
1982, Coate and Loury 1993 among others). Mailath et al. assume two groups of workers and
explain possible discrimination in the labor market by the interaction of search intensity of ￿rms
and skill investment decisions of workers. In this paper, we assume two kinds of skills and suggest
a possibility of di⁄erent treatments of the two skills. While they are more interested in one type of
equilibrium (discriminating one), we are more interested in the coexistence of two types of equilibria
(similar and unequal treatments of two skills).
Another branch of the literature this paper is related to is studies that emphasize the importance
of cognitive skills in a country￿ s economic development. In a series of papers, Hanushek and
colleagues (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Jamison et al., 2006; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008)
show that besides the quantity, the quality of human capital as measured by cognitive test scores
of international standardized tests matters in a country￿ s economic performance. Drawing an
attention to the importance of non-cognitive human capital, this paper adds another dimension of
human capital as a determinant of economic development. Not only does this paper supplement the
recent growth literature but it also o⁄ers a cautionary note to interpretations of the results drawn
from conventional empirical speci￿cations of growth regressions. If one acknowledges the role of
non-cognitive human capital in economic development, she is bound to admit that there is a trade-
o⁄ between cognitive and non-cognitive skill investments. Such a trade-o⁄ opens a possibility that
the existing empirical speci￿cations of the growth literature that control for a measure of cognitive
human capital alone may yield a bias due to the failure to consider the role of non-cognitive human
capital. Fortunately, however, such a bias reinforces rather than attenuates the importance of
6cognitive human capital in economic development.
2 Model
Human Capital We assume there are two kinds of human capital, HKi for i = 1;2. We consider
cognitive skills, which are usually measured by academic achievement, as HK1 and non-cognitive
skills such as leadership, communication skills, and social skills as HK2.11
Student-Workers There are a unit mass of identical student-workers. They can invest in HK1
and HK2. Let ti be the time invested in each type of human capital.
They can be either equipped with human capital or not. The probability of being equipped with
human capital depends on the time investment. For simplicity, we assume that the probability of
being equipped with each type of human capital is equal with a same time investment. Speci￿cally
f (t) is the probability of being equipped with human capital if time t is invested. Then f (t1) and
f (t2) are the probabilities of being equipped with each type of human capital. As a probability, f
lies between 0 and 1 with f (0) = 0 and limt!1 f (t) = 1. We assume f is increasing and concave:
0 < f0 < 1; f00 < 0.
The utility cost of the time investment is c(t1 + t2). We assume that this cost function is
increasing and convex: c0 ￿ 0 with c0 (0) = 0 and c00 > 0.
University-Firm A university-￿rm has two kinds of positions, j = 1;2 and can admit or hire
student-workers for each position. Let v be the value a student-worker produces when (s)he is hired.
If a student-worker, who is equipped with HK1, is admitted or hired for position 1, then v = ￿1. If
a student-worker, who is equipped with HK2, is admitted for position 2, then v = ￿2. Let us call
￿i the productivity of HKi. If a non-quali￿ed student-worker is admitted for each position, then
v = ￿D, i.e., a net loss incurs. If a student-worker is not admitted, (s)he will produce nothing. A
student-worker equipped with both HK1 and HK2 can be admitted for both positions at the same
time. Then her or his production is ￿1 + ￿2.
A university-￿rm cannot directly observe whether a student-worker is equipped with the human
capital, but it can invest in a technology to recognize the human capital. Let pi be the probability
of recognizing HKi if one has it. The cost of acquiring the technology pi is   (pi) with
  (0) = 0; lim
p!1
  (p) = 1;  0 ￿ 0 with  0 (0) = 0; 12  00 > 0:
11Even though there can be many subdivisions in these skills (Borghans et.al 2006), we just follow this widely used
classi￿cation for analytical convenience.
12The condition c
0 (0) =  
0 (0) = 0 is not essential. It is just for expositional convenience.
7The cost of investment in two recognition technologies is separable, so that the cost of acquiring
technologies p1 and p2 is   (p1) +   (p2). We also assume that there is no more additional cost
once the recognition technology is obtained. That is, the recognition technology can be applied to
student-workers without any cost.
Utility or Pro￿t The wage of a student-worker is determined through a bargaining process. We
will assume that the bargaining process results in an equal sharing of a produced value given that
it is positive. That is, the student-worker￿ s wage w is 1
2￿i if (s)he is hired in position j = i and the
university-￿rm￿ s revenue R is v￿w. For example, if a student-worker with HK1 is hired for position
1, then w = R = 1
2￿1. If a non-quali￿ed student-worker is hired, then w = 1
2￿i and R = ￿D￿ 1
2￿i.
Of course, if a student-worker is not hired, w = R = 0.
A student-worker￿ s utility u is the wage (s)he will get minus the cost of human capital invest-
ment:
u = w ￿ c(t1 + t2).
The university-￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿ is the revenue it generates from admission or hiring minus the cost
of investment on the recognition of each human capital. We abuse the notation, and denote R also
as an integrated sum of revenue from all hired student-workers;
￿ = R ￿   (p1) ￿   (p2):
Time Line The model follows the time line below:
1. The university-￿rm and the student-workers simultaneously make investment decisions. While
the university-￿rm decides how much to invest in recognition technologies of each human
capital pi, the student-workers decide how much time to spend on the acquisition of each
human capital ti.
2. The student-workers￿stochastic acquisition of human capital is realized.
3. The university-￿rm applies its recognition technologies to all the student-workers.
4. The university-￿rm makes an admission or hiring decision on each student-worker.
3 Analysis
We will analyze the model from the back. That is, we ￿rst analyze the university-￿rm￿ s admission-
hiring decision. Then we examine the investment decisions of the university-￿rm and the student-
workers.
83.1 University-Firm￿ s decision
3.1.1 Admission-Hiring Decision
In the ￿rst stage, the student-workers made investment decisions on ti and the university ￿rm on
pi. Since they are all identical, we restrict our attention to a symmetric equilibrium so that all
student-workers made a same decision on ti. Let us de￿ne ￿i = f (ti).
Note that a decision of admitting or hiring a student-worker in one position is totally indepen-
dent of a decision in the other position. We take the university-￿rm￿ s decision on each position
separately.
Once the recognition technology is applied, a student-worker is either recognized as being
equipped with human capital HKi or not. If a student-worker is recognized as equipped with
the human capital, the university-￿rm will admit or hire her (or him) in the relevant position since
R = 1
2￿i > 0.
If a student-worker is not recognized as equipped with the human capital, it is either because
(s)he is not equipped with it or because it is not recognized although (s)he is equipped with it.
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We assume that D is large enough so that (1) is negative.13 Then the university-￿rm will only
admit or hire student-workers who are recognized as being equipped with the human capital.
3.1.2 Investment Decisions on Recognition technology
In the ￿rst stage, the university-￿rm should make investment decisions on recognition technologies
for both kinds of human capital. Since the cost of investment is separable, the investment decisions
related to each human capital are separately made.
Consider the investment decision on recognition technology for HKi. Given student-workers￿
decisions ￿i, which is a portion of student-workers being equipped with HKi, the university-￿rm￿ s




￿i￿ipi ￿   (pi).
A portion of student-workers who are equipped with the human capital and recognized as such
by the university-￿rm is ￿ipi. They generate the revenue 1
2￿i. The optimal p￿
i that maximizes ￿i






￿if (ti) =  0 (p￿
i) for i = 1;2. (2)
13For the speci￿c condition, see footnote 14.
9Note that p￿
i is increasing in ￿i, henceforth in ti. That is, as there are more student-workers
equipped with HKi to be recognized, it is more pro￿table to increase the possibility of recognizing
them.
3.2 Student-Workers￿Investment Decision on Human Capital
We turn to the student-workers￿investment decision on HKi. Given the university-￿rm￿ s investment







￿2p2f (t2) ￿ c(t1 + t2).





i) ￿ c0 (t￿
1 + t￿
2) and equality holds if t￿
i > 0 for i = 1;2. (3)
Student-workers will invest until the marginal bene￿t of investment is equal to the marginal cost.
If the marginal cost is larger than the marginal bene￿t, no investment will incur. If the optimal
investment is interior, the student-workers will allocate their time investment so that the marginal
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1 + t￿
2).
Figure 2 graphically shows a student-worker￿ s optimal time allocation. Given the university-
￿rm￿ s recognition technology pi￿ s, a student-worker will ￿rst invest in human capital with a greater
marginal bene￿t, in this case HK1. Once the marginal bene￿t of the investment for each human
capital is the same, the additional time investment would be divided for both kinds of human
capital until those marginal bene￿ts are equal to the marginal cost of investment. At the optimum,
therefore, the marginal bene￿ts of the investment for both kinds of human capital are the same
and they are equal to the marginal cost of investment.14
Suppose that p1, the university-￿rm￿ s investment in recognition technology for HK1; increases.
This will increase the marginal bene￿t for the student-workers￿investment in HK1, and hence t1
will increase. Also, this increase in t1 will increase the marginal cost and crowd out the investment
for HK2.
14The maximum incentive to invest in HKi is obtained when pi = 1 and tj = 0. In that case, the maximum
















, in any equilibrium ￿i < ￿i. The expression (1) is largest when ￿i is large and pi is small.










2￿i, (1) is negative for any possible ￿i and pi.
10Figure 2: Optimal Time Allocation for HK1 and HK2
1 t 2 t 2 1 t t +
( ) 2 1 t t c + ¢
( ) 1 1 1 2
1
t f p ¢ f ( ) 2 2 2 2
1








1 t t + 1 t 2 t 2 1 t t +
( ) 2 1 t t c + ¢
( ) 1 1 1 2
1
t f p ¢ f ( ) 2 2 2 2
1








1 t t +
We should note that there exists a complementarity between student-worker￿ s investment and
the university-￿rm￿ s. The more university-￿rm invests in pi, the more incentive student-workers will
have to invest in HKi, and vice versa. This raises a possibility that there can be multiple equilibria
including both low investment coordination and high investment coordination. Moreover, it is also
possible that they coordinate in equilibria emphasizing either HK1 or HK2 even with the same
environment, which we will investigate in the next section.
3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is a combination of the university-￿rm￿ s decision and student-workers￿
decisions which are consistent with each other. Therefore, the following equilibrium characterization
results.










which satis￿es (2) and (3).
To get a better grasp of the equilibrium characterization, we will focus on an equilibrium













Function ￿ is an increasing function of ti and ￿i since  0 is increasing, and it is 0 when ti = 0. If
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11Figure 3: Equilibrium ti when tj is given
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Figure 3 shows the determination of ti with given tj according to (5). Expression 1
2￿i￿(ti;￿i)f0 (ti)
is 0 when ti = 0 since ￿(0) = 0 and f0 (0) is ￿nite, and approaches 0 as ti ! 1 since limti!1 f0 (ti) =
0 and ￿(ti) is ￿nite. It can have any shape in the middle; it will increase when the e⁄ect of increas-
ing ￿ is dominant and decreases when the e⁄ect of decreasing f0 is dominant. Expression c0 (ti + tj)
is increasing in ti given tj. An intersection of the two graphs will give ti satisfying (5) when tj is
￿xed.
We can point out the following four things about the determination of ti.15 First, ti = 0
always satis￿es the condition whatever tj is. The graph of c0 is always (weakly) above the graph
of 1
2￿i￿(ti;￿i)f0 (ti) when ti = 0 (they are the same when tj = 0 as c0 (0) = 0). This will satisfy
the inequality of (5). If student-workers do not invest in HKi, the university-￿rm has no incentive
to invest in the recognition technology for that human capital. If the university-￿rm does not
recognize the human capital, student-workers would not invest in that human capital. Therefore,
zero investment in HKi always satis￿es (5).
Second, we can have multiple intersections. As explained before, there exists a complementarity
between the university-￿rm￿ s investment and student-workers￿investment. It is possible that they
can coordinate in a lower investment level as they expect a low investment from each other. It
15Intersections in Fig 3 are not euilibrium yet, since it only satis￿es one equation in (5).
12is also possible that they expect a higher investment from each other and coordinate in a higher
investment level.
Third, when there are multiple intersections, they are Pareto ranked. If student-workers invest
more in HKi, the university-￿rm will be better o⁄even with the same investment in the recognition
technology. Since the university-￿rm optimizes its investment level at these intersections, the
university-￿rm would be better o⁄ with a higher coordination. Likewise, student-workers would be
better o⁄ in a higher investment coordination.
Fourth, there exists at least one stable intersection in the following sense.
De￿nition 2 An intersection ti is (locally) stable if there exists ￿ > 0 such that for all positive t0
















We can say ti is (locally) stable if an investment level tends to increase (decrease) when it is
slightly lower (higher) than ti. Student-workers will increase an investment at t0 if the marginal
bene￿t is greater than the marginal cost, and decrease an investment otherwise. The above de￿ni-
tion states that ti is stable if the marginal bene￿t is greater (smaller) than the marginal cost when
the investment level is lower (higher) than ti. According to it, the intersections are stable if the
graph of 1
2￿i￿(ti;￿i)f0 (ti) cuts that of c0 (ti + tj) from the above as ti increases. When student-
workers invest slightly more on HKi, this will increase an investment in the university-￿rm￿ s side.
This in turn will provide more investment incentive for student-workers. On the other hand, f0
decreases and c0 increases, which will reduce an incentive of investment. If the former dominates
the latter, then student-workers will increase an investment more and the intersection is not stable.
Note that ti = 0 is stable once tj > 0 and may or may not be stable when tj = 0 depending on
whether the graph of 1
2￿i￿(ti;￿i)f0 (ti) is above that of c0 (ti + tj) near ti = 0. If ti = 0 is not
stable when tj = 0 (i.e., the graph of 1
2￿i￿(ti;￿i)f0 (ti) is above that of c0 (ti + tj) near ti = 0),
then the graph of 1
2￿i￿(ti;￿i)f0 (ti) should cut through that of c0 (ti + tj) from the above at some
point since the former eventually goes to 0. Therefore, a stable intersection exists. Henceforth, we
restrict our attention to the stable intersections.
Now we can de￿ne a relationship between investment levels in two kinds of human capital from
Figure 3. That is, when tj is given, we can ￿nd a stable intersection de￿ning ti. Let ’i de￿ne the
relationship. By abusing the notation, we write
ti 2 ’i (tj) for i = 1;2 (6)
where ti is a stable intersection in Figure 3 given tj. The pairs (t1;t2) satisfying (6) will com-
prise a stable subset of equilibria. Note that ’i is a correspondence as there can be many stable
intersections for a given tj.
13Figure 4: Stuent-workers￿equilibrium time allocation
1 t
2 t
( ) 2 21 tt j =












( ) 2 21 tt j =




( ) 2 21 tt j =












( ) 2 21 tt j =
( ) 1 12 tt j =
1 t
2 t
( ) 2 21 tt j =
( ) 1 12 tt j =
(a) (b)
In the ￿gure, we can see that for any stable intersections, the investment in HKi decreases
as the investment in HKj increases. If tj increases from t0
j to t00
j, the graph of c0 moves up and
the intersection ti would decrease in any stable intersections. If the investment in the other kind
of human capital increases, this will increase the marginal cost of time investment. Therefore,
the investment for HKi will decrease. Since this will trigger a decrease in the university-￿rm￿ s
investment, ti will decrease further. If tj increases further to t000
j , then no investment will be made
in HKi.
Figure 4 shows ’1, ’2, and their intersections, which are stable equilibria in the sense of De￿-
nition 2. For expositional convenience, we ignore ti = 0 when there are other stable intersections.
We consider a case in which there is at most one stable intersection other than 0 as is the case
in Figure 3. Then ’i can be treated as a function. The intuition we get from the ￿gure can be
extended to a general case.
The graph ’i is decreasing as explained and it is not continuous. Consider ’1 for example (solid
graph in the ￿gure). It starts from a positive level at t2 = 0 and decreases as t2 increases. Once t2
goes over a certain level, then ’1 jumps to 0.
An equilibrium exists as there exists an intersection of two curves even though two curves are
not continuous. As in panel (a), if ’1 starts from over t￿
1 when t2 = 0, there exists an intersection
with t2 = 0. If ’1 starts from under t￿
1 and lies below ’2, then ’1 would end up below t￿
2 and there
14should be an intersection with t1 = 0. If ’1 starts from under t￿
1 and end up over t￿
2, then ’1 should
cross ’2 as in panel (b). Therefore, an equilibrium exists. For later use, note also that ’1 cuts ’2
from below at least once as t2 increases in all cases.
We can discuss another aspect of stability of an equilibrium. Even though an equilibrium is
already stable one by the standard of De￿nition 2, we can add another de￿nition of stability to an
equilibrium in Figure 4.
De￿nition 3 Suppose there exists an equilibrium E. We denote tn+1
1 ￿ ’1 (tn
2) and tn+1
2 ￿ ’2 (tn
1)
in the neighborhood of E. An equilibrium E is (locally) stable if there exists ￿ > 0 such that
limn!1 (tn
1;tn

















De￿nition 3 is a usual de￿nition of stability that a system returns to the original equilibrium
after small disturbances. According to this, an equilibrium is stable if ’1 cuts ’2 from below as
t2 increases. Suppose the university-￿rm increases the recognition of HK1. Then student-workers
increase an investment in HK1 and reduce their time for HK2. This will lead to a lower recognition
of HK2 and student-workers further reduce an investment in HK2 and increase that in HK1. The
increase in the investment for HK1 may or may not be large enough to justify the supposed increase
in recognition of HK1. If it is large enough, then this will further increase the recognition of HK1
and the equilibrium is not stable. If it is not, then the increased recognition of HK1 will roll back
to the original level and the equilibrium is stable.
A stable equilibrium by De￿nition 3 exists as we already argued above that ’1 cuts ’2 from
below at least once as t2 increases. We will restrict our attention to stable equilibria in the following
discussion and comparative statics.
Proposition 2 A stable equilibrium satisfying (6) and De￿nition 3 exists.
As illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 4, there can be many equilibria. According to De￿nition
3, E1, E3, and E5 are stable while E2 and E4 are not. Even if we restrict our attention to stable
equilibria only, we still have multiple equilibria in the ￿gure. In these equilibria, we can say there
exists a trade-o⁄ between two kinds of human capital. The marginal cost of time investment is
dependent on the time spent on the other type of human capital. Moreover, there exists a comple-
mentarity between student-workers￿investment and the university-￿rm￿ s investment. Therefore, a
higher investment and recognition coordination in HK1 will lead to a lower investment and recogni-
tion coordination in HK2. That is, if there is more emphasis on evaluation and development of one
kind of human capital, the other kind of human capital is relatively ignored. In extreme equilibria
like E1 and E5, we may have no investment at all in one kind of human capital.
Proposition 3 Given economic environment (￿1;￿2; ;f;c), we can have multiple stable equilibria.
In these equilibria, we have a trade-o⁄ in evaluation and development between HK1 and HK2. If
15one equilibrium has more recognition and development of HK1 than the other, it will have less
recognition and development of HK2.
In particular, equilibria like E1 and E3 can coexist under the same economic environment.
In E1, all the emphasis goes to cognitive skills as in East Asian countries. In E3, cognitive and
non-cognitive skills receive a similar emphasis as in the U.S. In East Asian countries, universities
do not pay much attention to the recognition of non-cognitive skills (p2 = 0) as students do not
invest much in the development of these skills (t2 = 0). Since universities do not recognize these
skills, students do not have an incentive to invest in these skills. As a result, we observe admission
standards centered on cognitive skills and students spending more time on academic activities. On
the contrary, in the U.S., universities pay attention to non-cognitive skills as well as cognitive skills
(positive p1 and p2). Students spend some of their time developing non-cognitive skills (positive
t1 and t2). As students invest some time in non-cognitive skills, universities also pay attention to
recognizing them.
3.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we discuss an e⁄ect of a change in the economic environment on equilibria. We
especially focus on two parameters. We ￿rst discuss an e⁄ect of a change in the productivity of
human capital ￿i. In the main analysis, we assumed that the costs of the recognition technologies
are the same. We relax this assumption and discuss an e⁄ect of cost di⁄erences.
3.4.1 Change in ￿i
Suppose that there is an increase in ￿2, i.e., non-cognitive skills become more important in the
economy. In equation (5), this will directly increase the LHS since it will increase the payo⁄ when
admitted (or employed). Also it will indirectly increase the LHS since the university-￿rm will have
more incentive to invest in the recognition technology, or ￿(t2;￿2) increases. The resulting change
in ’2 can be recognized in Figure 5.
As is clear in the ￿gure, when the term 1
2￿2￿(t2;￿2)f0 (t2) increases, t2 of any stable intersection
will increase. Therefore, ’2 will increase given t1 as in Figure 6. As the graph of ’2 moves upward,
all the stable equilibria show an (weak) increase in t2 and a (weak) decrease in t1. Note that we
can still have an extreme equilibrium E1 as panel (a) shows. That is, even if the productivity of
HK2 is larger than that of HK1 and the di⁄erence increases, it is possible that an economy remains
in the equilibrium in which only HK1 matters. If the productivity of HK2 increases further enough,
then the extreme equilibrium E1 will disappear and we may observe some emphasis on HK2 as E00
1
in panel (b). Of course, if we increase ￿2 further enough, then the unique equilibrium will be like
E3, that is, only HK2 matters in the economy.
16Figure 5: The e⁄ect of increase in ￿i on the shape of ’i
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This analysis sheds some light on a change in East Asian countries in the future. Even if
non-cognitive skills become more important, it may not be easy to move away from the present
arrangement. Suppose some of universities start changing their admission practices. This may not
a⁄ect students￿behavior since a portion of changed universities might be small. Even if it does
change students￿behavior, it will take time and these universities should endure disadvantages in
the meantime.
3.4.2 Change in an Investment Cost in Recognition Technology
We turn to an e⁄ect of a change in the recognition cost. In the main analysis, we assumed that
the costs of investment in the recognition technologies are the same. However, one type of human
capital may be harder to recognize than the other. For example, while HK1 is relatively easier to
recognize through various kinds of tests, HK2 is hardly measured directly and is usually evaluated
through circumstantial evidence such as a participation in activities which are deemed to increase
HK2. Here we assume that recognition technologies require di⁄erent costs of investment,  1 and
 2.
Suppose that HK2 becomes easier to recognize. That is,  2 decreases for any p2. This will
increase the LHS of equation (5). Therefore it will have qualitatively the same e⁄ect as an increase
in ￿2 analyzed before. For any stable equilibria, t1 (weakly) increases and t2 (weakly) decreases.
Di⁄erences in the recognition technology in two kinds of human capital might be the main
17Figure 6: The e⁄ect of increase in ￿2 on equilibria
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reason why we have the present arrangement in East Asian countries. It might have been much
easier to observe and verify the accumulation of cognitive skills. Then paying attention to cognitive
skills only might have been a unique equilibrium. It is possible, however, that they remain in that
equilibrium even though recognition of non-cognitive skills becomes cheaper.
3.5 Welfare Analysis - An Illustration
When we have multiple equilibria which possibly represent di⁄erent social arrangements in East
Asia and the U.S., we are naturally interested in the Pareto ranking of these equilibria. The question
is which arrangement will utilize human resources better with a given productivity of each skill.
If we jump to the answer, there is no generally-held Pareto ranking among equilibria. This will
be illustrated in this section. We will compare the equilibrium with exclusive emphasis on HK1
with the one with similar emphasis on both skills. If emphasis is exclusively put on one skill, the
complementarity between the student-workers￿investment and the university-￿rm￿ s recognition will
be fully exploited. However, this exploitation of complementarity comes with decreasing returns
to investment. If the bene￿t of exploiting complementarity is larger than the cost of decreasing
returns, the equilibrium with exclusive emphasis on one skill will yield a better outcome. Otherwise,
the equilibrium with similar emphasis on both skills will be better.
Let us consider the social planner￿ s problem. We maintain the constraint that both student-
workers investment and the university-￿rm￿ s recognition are necessary for HKi to contribute to the




[￿if (ti)pi ￿   (pi)] ￿ c(t1 + t2). (7)
The social planner will choose (ti;pi)
2
i=1 to maximize W.
This is not a well-de￿ned concave programming problem, and the ￿rst order condition does not
characterize the optimum. If we ￿x ti￿ s, however, an optimal po
i is determined by the ￿rst order
condition.
￿if (ti) =  0(po
i) for i = 1;2
This is similar to the university-￿rm￿ s optimal decision (2) except that we have the entire value of
￿i as bene￿t rather than 1
2￿i. We can use the ￿ function de￿ned in (4) to express po
i in terms of
ti; po







[￿if (ti)￿(ti;2￿i) ￿   (￿(ti;2￿i))] ￿ c(t1 + t2).




f￿if (ti)￿(ti;2￿i) ￿   (￿(ti;2￿i))g
= ￿if0 (ti)￿(ti;2￿i).
Note that an indirect e⁄ect through the change of ￿(ti;2￿i) will be 0 as po
i is optimally chosen
given ti.
Since our purpose is to illustrate that the equilibria are not generally Pareto ranked, we consider
a symmetric case for simplicity, ￿1 = ￿2. We will compare the welfare between the extreme
equilibrium with t2 = 0 and the symmetric one with t1 = t2. We further assume, for expositional







as ￿(ti;2￿i) = 2￿(ti;￿i). Note that 1
4MBti is the same as the LHS of equilibrium condition (5).
In a symmetric equilibrium, as t1 = t2 = tS, an equilibrium is achieved when 1
4MBt = c0(2tS). In
an extreme equilibrium where t1 = tE, an equilibrium is achieved when 1
4MBt = c0 ￿
tE￿
.
Fig 7 shows the determination of two types of equilibria and their welfare comparison. Two
types of equilibria are the same in that tS amount of time is initially invested on HK1. A di⁄erence
is made in the type of human capital the additional time is invested on. In an extreme equilibrium,
additional time tE ￿ tS will be invested further on HK1. In a symmetric equilibrium, additional
time tS will be invested on HK2.
19Figure 7: Welfare Comaparison - Extreme Equilibrium and Symmetric Equilibrium
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Welfare di⁄erences of two types of equilibrium come from di⁄erences in bene￿t and cost brought
by this additional time investment. If it takes a high initial investment to build up the bene￿t of
complementarity and the bene￿t does not diminish quickly as in panel (a), welfare gains of this
additional time investment is larger in an extreme equilibrium. In the ￿gure, the area under MBt
and above c0(t) over
￿
tS;tE￿






bene￿t of complementarity is quickly built up but diminishes quickly as in panel (b), a symmetric
equilibrium will bring a larger welfare gain.
It is illustrated that there will be no generally-held Pareto ranking among equilibria. While the
extreme equilibrium exploits the complementarity between the student-workers￿and the university-
￿rm￿ s investments, the symmetric equilibrium can enjoy higher returns to investment. Which is
Pareto better depends on the relative size of two bene￿ts. Therefore, we cannot a priori tell whether
U.S. or East Asian societies have a better arrangement for the utilization of human resources.
4 Discussion
In this section we will discuss the validity of our modeling choices and how essential they are to the
result. We also discuss one possible historic and cultural factor which may a⁄ect which equilibrium
20each society settles in: an educational ideal.
4.1 Discussions on Model Setting
4.1.1 Separate Development of Human Capital
Though, for analytical convenience, we assumed a separate development of two aspects of human
capital, it is more realistic that a development of both aspects can interact with each other. That
is, well-developed non-cognitive skills enhance a cognitive development and vice versa (Cunha and
Heckman 2006, 2007). For example, personal perseverance and endurance can make students acad-
emically more successful. Therefore, if universities only consider students￿academic performances,
they do not only measure cognitive skills but also non-cognitive skills embodied in them. Students
also have an incentive to invest in non-cognitive skills even when only academic performances are
measured.
It is reasonable to assume, however, that an interaction of two aspects of human capital is more
limited than a direct e⁄ect of investment speci￿ed for a certain skill. Time spent on academic
activities will be more e⁄ective for advancing academic achievement than time spent for developing
non-cognitive skills which will indirectly develop cognitive skills. Therefore, an investment in non-
cognitive skills will be limited if measures of cognitive skills alone matter in university admissions.
Allowing for a interaction between two skill developments would not change our main results much.
4.1.2 Non-negligible Investment Cost of Recognition
Some may argue that little investment is necessary for universities to recognize di⁄erent aspects
of human capital. More speci￿cally, any assessment of non-cognitive skills such as extra-curricular
activities and community involvement can be done easily if a university decides to do so.
Even though it may not be hard to require students to submit records of those extra-curricular
activities, it might be di¢ cult to read the capacity of students correctly from the records. Admission
o¢ ces in U.S. institutions are usually sta⁄ed with o¢ cers specializing in reading and evaluating
application packets. The median salary of these admission o¢ cers is around $80,000.16 If an
admission o¢ ce is sta⁄ed with 10 to 12 professional experts, this is not a negligible amount of
investment.
4.1.3 No Limit on Class Size
We assume there are two di⁄erent positions in a university-￿rm and there is no limit in the number
of positions. In actual university admissions, however, there is a limited class size and both aspects
16www.salary.com
21of human capital can be considered at the same time. It would be more realistic if we assume the
limited positions in a university and admission decisions based on the evaluation of both aspects.
However, the current model setting captures a university￿ s decision problem fairly well. As a
class size is limited, it will be very costly to ￿ll the class based on relatively inaccurate information.
The cost of admitting ill-equipped students in this model captures such a cost caused by the limited
class size. Admission probability will increase if students are evaluated highly in both aspects of
human capital. Being hired in both positions at the same time in this model captures that increase
in admission probability. Therefore, this model setting can be easily translated into admissions
based on an evaluation of both aspects with a limited class size, and the main results will hold if
we change the model setting in that way.
4.2 Why does each society end up in the present equilibrium?
Models of multiple equilibria can explain how di⁄erent arrangements can be maintained as economic
fundamentals become similar, but do not o⁄er an explanation why a certain equilibrium is chosen
for each society. This paper is no exception. In this section, we will propose some possible historic
origins which may help to explain how the current arrangement is reached.
In East Asian societies, it is a very long tradition to select an elite group through an examination
testing cognitive skills only. Appointment as a public o¢ cial is an important route to joining the
ruling elite, and these public o¢ cials are selected through such an exam. In China, the ￿imperial
examination￿started in Sui dynasty (589-618) and lasted for 1,300 years until 1905 (Miyazaki 1976).
The modern examination system for hiring civil servants is believed to indirectly evolve from the
imperial exam. This also a⁄ected surrounding countries. For example, in Korea, the gwageo, a
similar national civil service exam, ￿rst started in 788 and continued until 1894 (Lee 1981). It is
also believed that a modern day civil service exam originated from this. Such a long tradition of
selection based on an exam could have a⁄ected the modern way of human capital evaluation.
In the U.S., it seems that a cultural and educational ideal of elite Protestants played an impor-
tant role in the current shape of admissions process.17 The WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant)
upper class, which was a leading group in the late 19th century, emphasized other conditions as
well as an intellectual development for a desirable human. Aims of elite boarding schools, which
were major suppliers of students to leading private universities, were to ￿cultivate manly, Christian
character, having regard to moral and physical as well as intellectual development...￿Though the
passing of an entrance exam was the only requirement for an admission to elite universities at that
time, it seems that other characters were taken for granted through the secondary education. The
Rhodes scholarships, the oldest international educational fellowships which started in 1902 and are
17Current discussions on the U.S. are heavily indebted to Karabel (2005).
22still in action, explicitly show this ideal in its four selection criteria: scholarstic attainments, energy
shown in sports activity, character, and morality.18
As secondary education expanded in 1920s, elite universities started to restrict the size of fresh-
men class - birth of selective admissions. Rather than increasing academic standards of entrance
exams, they chose to turn to the cultural and educational ideal of elite Protestants, which was
embodied in the Rhodes criteria.19 Subjective criteria such as character came to play an important
role in admissions. While the relative importance of objective academic criterion and subjective
personal one may have been changing since, the basic structure of admissions standards has been
maintained.
5 Empirical Relevance
In this section, we will discuss empirical implications of the paper and evaluate the empirical
relevance of our argument by actually testing one implication.
5.1 Implications
5.1.1 E⁄ect of Non-cognitive Skills on Labor Market Outcome
Our model suggests that e⁄ects of non-cognitive skills on labor market outcomes may vary among
countries. There have been some studies showing a positive impact of non-cognitive skills on labor
market outcomes. These studies mostly used U.S. data. In East Asian countries, however, as
non-cognitive skills are not recognized as well as in the U.S., this e⁄ect would be smaller.
We are not arguing that the e⁄ect is small in every country where academic achievement is the
only admissions standard. The U.S. is a quite special case in that universities explicitly consider
measures of non-cognitive skills in admissions. Even if a university considers only academic mea-
sures, non-cognitive skills can be recognized in the labor market. Universities may not explicitly
consider them because it is just too costly to do that. To induce a development of non-cognitive
skills, however, universities can reduce the importance of academic measures in admissions. That
is, academic achievement can be evaluated as a certain minimum requirement, or a small distinction
of academic achievement may not be recognized. In this way, universities can induce an investment
in non-cognitive skills which are not easily measured.20
18Rhodes Brochure at http://www.rhodesscholar.org/info.
19Karabel (2005) also argues that this change was to restrict the growing Jewish population among freshmen.
20According to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), agents with multi-tasks, some of which have well-measured per-
formances while others have no clear performance measures available, should be given a muted incentive scheme. If
a strong incentive scheme is given to well-measured tasks, this will reduce the performance in other tasks. By the
same logic, reducing the importance of acadmic measures can induce more investment in non-cognitive skills.
235.1.2 Relationship between Labor Productivity and Cognitive Skills
As internationally comparable test scores are developed and released, there have been studies
that relate these test scores to a country￿ s economic performances. Our model suggests that this
study should also control for the time spent on non-cognitive skill development since these test
scores mainly measure cognitive skills. If a country has a high average score with much time
spent on academic activities, this country must have invested relatively less on non-cognitive skills.
Therefore, this country￿ s economic performance would be less stellar compared with a country with
a similar test score but less time spent on academic activities.
Our model also proposes a cautionary note for an implication of these studies. Cognitive skills
are important in economic performances and developing countries need to promote them. However,
it is not warranted that they should invest in these cognitive skills at any cost. An emphasis on
cognitive skills cannot but lead to a relative neglect of other skills. A country has to weigh this cost
carefully in the development strategy of cognitive skills. Especially for East Asian countries which
put an enough emphasis on cognitive skills, it might be necessary to pay less attention to them.
5.2 Test
Here we provide empirical evidence supporting an argument that an investment in non-cognitive
human capital matters in a country￿ s economic performance and its implications for empirical
analyses. Given a trade-o⁄ between cognitive and non-cognitive skill investments, an implication
of the importance of non-cognitive human capital for an empirical analysis is that an investment
in non-cognitive skills is an omitted variable in conventional growth regressions. An omission of
an important variable yields a bias in an OLS estimate of the e⁄ect of cognitive skills. To examine
our claims, we estimate the following model of economic performance or growth regressions that
considers the quality of both cognitive and non-cognitive human capital:
yi = ￿0 + ￿1Ci + ￿2NC i + ￿3Xi + ui
where yi is a measure of country i￿ s economic performance; Ci is i￿ s level of cognitive skills proxied
by the average score of an international standardized test; NC i is i￿ s level of an investment in
non-cognitive skills; Xi is a vector of i￿ s observable characteristics; and ui is the error term.
The current paper argues that ￿2 > 0 and that an OLS estimate for ￿1 may be subject to a
negative bias due to Cov(Ci;NC i) < 0 if NCi is not controlled for in the regression. Conventional
growth regressions ignore a potential positive e⁄ect of non-cognitive skills on a country￿ s economic
performance, thus understating an impact of cognitive skills on it. If NCi is included as an extra
explanatory variable, we expect an OLS estimate for ￿1 to increase and that for ￿2 to be signi￿cantly
positive.
245.2.1 Data
In the analysis that follows, yi is measured by either a country￿ s contemporary level of output per
worker, total factor productivity, or average growth rate of GDP per capita from 1960 to 2000,
following conventional models. Ci is proxied by a country￿ s average math score of an international
test and NC i by a country￿ s average share of students￿daily time devoted to activities related to
non-cognitive skills. Depending on the speci￿cation, Xi includes GDP per capita in 1960, years of
schooling in 1960 and 1988 and a measure of physical capital stocks in 1988.
These variables are drawn from three separate sources. Information on the average growth rate
of GDP per capita from 1960 to 2000, GDP per capita in 1960, and years of schooling in 1960 is
extracted from Jamison et al. (2006). The contemporary level of output per worker (log(Y=L)),
the total factor productivity (log(TFP)), the capital-output ratio ((￿=(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ log(K=Y )) and
years of schooling in 1988 are drawn from Hall and Jones (1999). A country￿ s average math score
and average share of daily time on activities related to non-cognitive skills are extracted from the
Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 1995, for the 13-year-old students
(Population 2) (Gonzalez and Smith, 1997).
To the best of our knowledge, TIMSS 1995 is the only international data source that can
serve our purpose, as it contains information on both a country￿ s average score of cognitive tests
and a share of activities related to non-cognitive skills. Other international data sets such as
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) of the OECD and the Progress in
International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) provide information on a country￿ s average scores
of cognitive tests but not a measure of an investment in non-cognitive skills. Based on the answers
to a student￿ s daily time use in TIMSS 1995, we classify ￿ playing sports￿and ￿ playing or talking
with friends outside of school￿as activities related to non-cognitive skills. These non-cognitive skill
activities exclude miscellaneous activities such as ￿ watching TVs and videos￿ , ￿ playing computer
games￿ , and ￿ working at a paid job￿as well as academic activities such as ￿ studying mathematics
or science after school￿ , ￿ taking extra lesson/cramming school in mathematics or science￿ , etc. In
the analysis a share of daily hours spent on the non-cognitive skill activities out of daily total used
time is used as a measure of an investment in non-cognitive skills.
Table 2 shows correlation coe¢ cients between variables for 30 countries that have valid infor-
mation for subsequent analysis.21 Two observations are noteworthy. First, the average math score
of a country￿ a measure of the quality of cognitive human capital￿ has a positive correlation with
the average growth rate (0.548), log(Y=L) (0.399) and log(TFP) (0.302) but it has a negative
correlation with the share of activities related to non-cognitive skills (￿0:063). Second, the share
21These 30 countries are as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, France,
West Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New
zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, U.S.A.
25Table 2: Correlation Coe¢ cients between Variables (N=30)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Avg growth rate (1960-2000) 1.000
(2) log (Y/L) -0.171 1.000
(3) log (Total Factor Productivity) 0.017 0.861 1.000
(4) Avg math score/100 in 1995 0.548 0.399 0.302 1.000
(5) Share of activities related -0.502 0.620 0.396 -0.063 1.000
to non-cognitive skills
(6) Years of schooling in 1988 -0.276 0.607 0.166 0.341 0.483 1.000
(7) Capital-output ratio in 1988 -0.445 0.471 0.113 0.095 0.585 0.446 1.000
of activities related to non-cognitive skills has a positive correlation with log(Y=L) (0.620) and
log(TFP) (0.396), while having a negative correlation with the average growth rate (￿0:502). As
suggested in the paper, a negative correlation between the average math score and the share of
non-cognitive skill activities implies that conventional cross-country regressions that control for the
quality of cognitive human capital alone are likely to be subject to a negative bias. To avoid such
a bias, the regressions need to control also for an investment in non-cognitive skills that increases
a country￿ s economic performance.
5.2.2 Results
Table 3 presents empirical evidence supporting such possibilities. In column (1), following conven-
tional cross-country regressions, log(Y=L) is regressed against measures of the quality of cognitive
human capital, the quantity of general human capital (years of schooling) and the capital-output
ratio as de￿ned in Hall and Jones (1999). Such a speci￿cation is based on a decomposition of
output per worker into educational attainment, the capital-output ratio and total factor produc-
tivity suggested in Hall and Jones (1999). The average math score (0.151) is positively associated
with log(Y=L), although the estimate is not statistically signi￿cant; the years of schooling (0.113)
is also positively and statistically signi￿cantly associated with log(Y=L); the capital-output ratio
(0.609) is positively associated with log(Y=L), although insigni￿cant. If the share of non-cognitive
skill activities is added as in column (2), the degree of association between the average math score
and log(Y=L) (0.246) becomes about 1.6 times as large. Although the coe¢ cient of the average
math score is signi￿cant only at the 0.08 level (partly due to a small sample), an increase in the
size of the coe¢ cient suggests that there is an omitted variable in the conventional cross-country
regression as in column (1). As expected, the estimate for the share of non-cognitive skill activities
26Table 3: Cross-country Regression Results by OLS
Mean Avg growth rate
Dependent variables: (S.D.) log (Y/L) log (TFP) (1960-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg math score/100 in 1995 5.014 0.151 0.246* 0.157* 0.168 1.328* 1.445*
(0.572) (0.106) (0.135) (0.096) (0.111) (0.169) (0.189)
Share of activities related 0.296 3.206* 1.791* 3.642
to non-cognitive skills (0.076) (1.223) (0.941) (2.415)
Years of schooling in 1988 7.797 0.113* 0.073*
(2.315) (0.038) (0.040)
Capital-output ratio in 1988 0.471 0.609 -0.272
(0.121) (0.796) (0.900)
GDP per capita in 1960 7891.0 0.000* 0.000*
(4358.2) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling in 1960 6.984 0.013 -0.031
(2.621) (0.104) (0.100)
Constant - 7.897* 7.189* 7.667* 7.085* -2.093* -3.191*
- (0.546) (0.717) (0.473) (0.665) (0.934) (1.139)
R-squared 0.370 0.480 0.040 0.130 0.728 0.744
Sample size 32 32 32 32 28 28
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimate is signi￿cant at the
0.1 level.
is signi￿cantly positive. A 10 percent increase in the share of non-cognitive activities from the
sample mean (i.e., from 0.296 to 0.326) increases a country￿ s output per worker by approximately
9.6 percent.
A similar but less dramatic pattern arises if total factor productivity of a country, which is
a measure of productivity that is more closely related with a country￿ s quality of human capital
according Hall and Jones (1999), is considered as a dependent variable in columns (3) and (4).
When log(TFP) is regressed against the average math score alone in column (3), the average math
score (0.157) is positively associated with log(TFP), the coe¢ cient being signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero at the 0.1 level. In column (3), the years of schooling and the capital-output ratio, which
are included in columns (1) and (2), are not controlled for because both of them have been already
considered in generating log(TFP) by Hall and Jones (1999).22 If the share of non-cognitive skill
22Including the years of schooling and the capital-output ratio in columns (3) and (4) fails to yield qualitatively
di⁄erent results than those presented in Table 3. If they are controlled for as explanatory variables, the coe¢ cient of
the average math score is 0.131 (s.e. 0.112) for column (3), and 0.223 (s.e. 0.140) for column (4), while insigni￿cant
27activities is added as in column (4), the degree of association between the average math score and
log(TFP) increases to 0.168, which is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 0.14 level. Moreover,
the estimate for the share of non-cognitive skill activities is signi￿cantly positive. Therefore cross-
country regressions that control for the quality of cognitive human capital alone but omit an
investment in non-cognitive human capital understate the true impact of cognitive human capital
on a country￿ s productivity. Activities related to non-cognitive skills positively a⁄ect a country￿ s
productivity. A 10 percent increase in the share of non-cognitive activities from the sample mean
(i.e., from 0.296 to 0.326) increases a country￿ s total factor productivity by approximately 5.4
percent.
Discussing why the U.S. has been showing robust economic performances while it has never done
well in international cognitive assessments, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) propose the following
three factors as potential explanations: openness and ￿ uidity of its markets, rapid quantitative
expansion of education, and e¢ cient higher education. The ￿nding of the current paper that non-
cognitive skills matter a country￿ s productivity adds one more reason why the U.S. is exceptional to
their explanations, shedding light on potential determinants of a country￿ s economic performance.
Among 32 countries considered in our empirical analysis, the U.S. ranks relatively high at the 12nd
place in the share of non-cognitive skill activities while ranking at the 24th in the average math
score.
When the average growth rate of per capita GDP between 1960 and 2000 is employed as a
dependent variable as in columns (5) and (6), the share of non-cognitive skill activities is also
found to have a positive e⁄ect, while the estimate is signi￿cant at the 0.145 level. As expected, the
estimate for the average math score increases as the share of non-cognitive skill activities is added as
an explanatory variable, suggesting that the true impact of cognitive skill on growth is likely to be
understated if an investment in non-cognitive human capital is omitted. While speci￿cations based
on the growth rate of output per capita as in columns (5) and (6) are more popular in the growth
literature (Mankiw et al, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), we put more weight on the estimates
of columns (2) and (4). The empirical evidence for this paper is likely to be better illustrated by
speci￿cations based on the level of the output per worker or the total factor productivity. If the
growth rate of the output per worker is used as an outcome variable, it is in general di¢ cult to
distinguish the role of capital accumulation from that of productivity enhancement in economic
performance. Both cognitive and non-cognitive human capitals, however, are likely to be more
closely related with productivity enhancement than with capital accumulation.
in both speci￿cations.
286 Conclusion
This paper introduced a model of human capital investment and evaluation with multiple aspects
of human capital. When there is an interaction between investment and evaluation, there can be
multiple equilibria. Therefore, with the same economic environment, one society emphasizes only
one aspect of human capital while other society emphasizes both aspects.
The model can accommodate the discrepancies in university admissions standards between the
U.S. and East Asian countries. The model predicted that more time investment in academic activi-
ties will go together with more emphasis on academic evaluation, and that even time investment on
academic and non-cognitive skill activities with even emphasis on both aspects. This is consistent
with what we observe in East Asian countries and the U.S.
The model also has empirical implications in the relationship between cognitive skills and eco-
nomic performances. Empirical tests of this implication reasonably support the model￿ s empirical
relevance.
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